目次
I: Nash's Model of Bargaining.- Section A. Introduction.- Section B. The Formal Model and Axiomatic Derivation.- Nash's Theorem.- Individual Rationality.- Symmetry and Asymmetry.- Section C. Probabilistic Models.- Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Game.- Bargaining as a Single Player Decision Problem.- A Model of Negotiation.- Section D. Risk Posture.- Comparative Risk Aversion.- Boldness and Fear of Ruin.- Strategic Risk Posture and the Utility of Bargaining.- II: Other Models of Bargaining.- Section A. A Critical Evaluation of the Independence Properties.- Independence of Equivalent Utility Representations.- Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.- Section B. Ordinal Models of Bargaining.- Section C. Interpersonal Models of Bargaining.- Proportional Solutions.- Ordinal Interpersonal Comparisons.- Section D. "Irrelevant" Alternatives.- An Individually Monotonic Solution.- Dependence on the Ideal Point.- Appendix: Summary of the Principal Properties and Results.