目次
I. Rationality and Coalition Formation Experiments.- 1.1 Players and Rationality.- 1.2 Previous Research Paradigms.- 1.3 Predictability of "Rational" Play.- 1.4 Purposes of the Present Study.- II. Experimental Method.- 2.1 Subjects.- 2.2 Procedure.- 2.2.1 The Coalitions Program.- 2.2.2 Communication Order and Role Assignment.- 2.3 Experimental Games.- III. Experimental Results.- 3.1 Preliminary Examinations.- 3.2 Comparisons with Previous Studies.- 3.3 Tests of the Models.- 3.3.1 The Bargaining Set Ml(i).- 3.3.2 The Competitive Bargaining Set Hl(i).- 3.3.3 The Kernel.- 3.3.4 Equal Share Analysis.- 3.4 Bargaining Process Analysis.- 3.4.1 Messages.- 3.4.2 Tracing Procedure.- IV. Discussion and Conclusions.- References.- Appendix: Game Protocols.